- CONTENTS OF THIS PAGE
- MILITARY DOCTRINE
- OPERATIONAL ART
- FUNDAMENTALS AND PRINCIPLES OF WAR
- LEVELS OF WAR
- OPERATIONAL FACTORS
- Operational Level Functions / War Fighting Functions
- THEATRE
- APPROACH CONCEPT AND FRAMEWORKS
- Positional (Attritional) Approach
- Manoeuvrist Approach
- Blitzkrieg (lightning warfare)
- COMMANDERS CORE FUNCTIONS
- The Campaign-Winning Cycle
- DESIGN CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORKS
- Centre of Gravity
- END STATE
- INTERMEDIATE END STATE
- Lines of operation
- Decisive points (DP)/ Decisive conditions (DC)
- Sequencing
- STRATEGIC THEORY
MILITARY DOCTRINE
Military Doctrine
The framework that guides armed forces on how to conduct campaigns and major operations. Contains the agreed standards and norms for conducting the warfare business. Military doctrine is a central concept in how armed forces think, plan, and fight. It combines ideas about what works in war with formal guidance approved by military authorities, shaping training, command, and actual operations. The fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives, doctrine is authoritative, but requires judgement in application (Nisser, 2024).
The J-STAFF
Military and civilian Joint cells that are specialist advisors to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC).
CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE FOR THE JTF
Multiple capabilities will be assigned to the JTFC. The JTFC must strive to understand the command affiliation of the capabilities allocated to him or her and the operational and strategic effects that these capabilities bring to bear.
- Infantry
- Air
- Navy
- Armour
- Air Defence Artillery (ADA)
- Artillery
- Special Forces (SF)
- Paratroopers
OPERATIONAL ART
OPERATIONAL ART
Operational art is the art of translating strategic-level objectives into tactical-level actions to achieve a decisive military outcome. Operational art includes the processes required for a successful military campaign or major operation: planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining. Operational art is also defined as the theory and practice of planning, preparing and conducting campaigns to accomplish operational and strategic objectives.
OPERATIONAL ART SUMMARY
FUNDAMENTALS AND PRINCIPLES OF WAR
| PRINCIPLES OF WAR (PoW) | FUNDAMENTALS OF WAR (FoW) |
|---|---|
| Principles of War are enduring, high-level strategic guidelines that govern the philosophy of combat | Fundamentals of War are the practical, situational mechanics used to execute operations on the ground |
| 1. C2: unity of command (see unity of effort) 2. Intelligence 3. Movement and Manoeuvre 4. Concentration of effort (Schwerpunkt) 5. Sustainment / logistic support 6. Protection / Security 7. Aim Selection and Maintenance 8. Morale maintenance 9. Reserves Maintenance 10. Offensive action 11. Surprise 12. Economy of force 13. Flexibility 14. Cooperation | 1. Joint and multinational 2. Arranging operations 3. Conflict termination 4. Balance 5. Synergy 6. Simultaneity and depth 7. Anticipation 8. Leverage 9. Timing and tempo 10. Operational reach and approach 11. Decisive action 12. Total effect 13. Agility 14. Freedom of action (as intent) |
LEVELS OF WAR
The levels of war framework describes how political goals are translated into military strategy, campaign design, and tactical battles. The levels are national strategic, military strategic, operational and tactical. The value of thinking in levels is to ensure that tactical actions serve operational designs, which in turn serve strategic and political aims, rather than being disconnected (Viggers, 2020).
| NO | LEVEL OF WAR | NOTES |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | National Strategic | – Correlates with Theatre of War (TOW) in the theatre organisation. – National Strategic posture is defined. – Guiding Documents (Higer Order): Narrative / General idea. – Military Frameworks: National Policy. |
| 2 | Military Strategic | – Correlates with Theatre of Operations (TOP) in the theatre organisation. – The requirement for military force or military action is stated. – The end-state for the military intervention, which is in support of national strategic posture, is stated. – Guiding Documents (Higer Order): Narrative / General idea. – Military Frameworks: Theatre Strategy. |
| 3 | Operational | – Correlates with Areas of Operations (AOO) in the theatre organisation. – The “WAYS” for attaining the Military Strategic End-State are clarified. – Guiding Documents (Higer Order): Narrative / General idea. – Military Frameworks: Campaigns and Major Operations. |
| 4 | Tactical | – Correlates with Combat Zone and sectors in the theatre organisation. – Guiding Documents (Lower Order): Scenarios, Vignettes, incidents, Injects. – Military framework: battles, engagements and small unit actions. |
OPERATIONAL FACTORS
- FACTOR FORCE
- FACTOR SPACE
- FACTOR TIME
- FACTOR INFORMATION
- FACTOR LAW
Operational Level Functions / War Fighting Functions
Operational level functions are categories that group military activities so commanders can plan, synchronise, and assess operations as a coherent system, rather than as isolated actions.
| 1 | Command and Control (C2) | Command and Control (C2) enables the commander to synchronise and coordinate other operational level functions and elements, such as intelligence, firepower, and combat power, to achieve a successful mission. |
| 2 | Intelligence | Intelligence provides commanders with a decision advantage by analysing threats, terrain and civilian considerations in order to make a timely decision. |
| 3 | Movement and Manoeuvre | Movement: The physical relocation of forces without engaging in direct combat. It disperses, deploys, or relocates personnel, equipment, and logistics across tactical or strategic distances. Manoeuvre: The strategic or tactical employment of forces. It combines physical movement with direct or indirect fires to achieve a position of relative advantage |
| 4 | Firepower (Operational fires) | Coordinated application of lethal and non-lethal firepower to achieve decisive effects across an entire theatre of operations (TOO) |
| 5 | Sustainment | Connects strategic national capabilities with tactical execution to provide the joint force (JF) with freedom of action, extended operational reach, and prolonged endurance |
| 6 | Protection | Preserving assets, maintaining freedom of action, and ensuring the survivability of capabilities |
THEATRE
Theatre of war. The Theatre of War (TOW) defines the environment upon which a military operation is conducted such as sea, land, air and space.
Theatre Organization and structure
| CAMPAIGN CONCEPT | LEVEL OF WAR | EXPLANATION |
|---|---|---|
| Theatre of war (TOW) | National strategy | Addresses national, political and strategic objectives Stating national and political “ENDS” |
| Theatre of operations (TOO) | Military strategic | Addresses military strategic objectives Stating Military “ENDS” |
| Areas of operations | Operational – Land / Air / Maritime /Joint | Addresses operational objectives and entails air space, Maritime, land and joint areas Designing “WAYS” i.e. campaigns and major operations for achieving the ends |
| Combat zones / sectors | Tactical Land /Air/ Maritime | Deals with Tactical objectives Executing MEANS (Battles) to support the ENDS |
Theatre Elements
| Positions | Militarily important geographic positions that are or could be used for offensive or defensive operations. War is greatly influenced by the geostrategic position of both sides. |
| Base of Operations | A physical space from where one’s force starts to move toward their respective physical objectives or find refuge if forces are to withdraw. |
| Physical objectives | Physical or abstract features to be seized, held, controlled or neutralised in case of hostilities. |
| Decisive Points (DP) | Points from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity (COG) can be threatened. |
| Lines of operations | Imaginary conceptual lines along which forces move from bases towards a given physical objective. |
| Lines of retreat | Start near the objective and end at one’s base of operations. |
| Lines of communication | Designated lines of movement between two points over which troops and material are transported. |
Scope of the theatre
| SCOPE AREA + OPS | EXPLANATION |
|---|---|
| Rear operations | Main purpose of rear ops: Provide own force freedom of action to sustain close and deep operations. Aimed against oppositional forces’ deep penetration, the primary aim is to support the commander’s intent. |
| Close operations | Main purpose: DESTROY oppositional force and eliminate a decisive part of his combat power. It includes the decisive battles and occurs over a short range or time frame. The main effort is employed for close operations. In the area where OWN Forces are in immediate contact with oppositional forces |
| Deep operartions | Main function: FIND and FIX (see Commander core functions) the OPFOR in order to create conditions for close battles. Deny OPFOR freedom of action, break morale disrupt command and control. Utilises 3 important principles: deception, target acquisition (TA) and interdiction. |
COMPREHENSIVE FUNCTIONS
APPROACH CONCEPT AND FRAMEWORKS
Positional (Attritional) Approach
Attrition is a reduction in the number of personnel, weapons, and equipment in a military unit, organisation, or force. Attrition is the fighting designed to harass and wear down the enemy’s resources and patience without directly confronting the main sources of their military strength (Baylis et al., 2022, p. 168).
Manoeuvrist Approach
The manoeuvrist approach is an indirect tactical approach utilised by a military force with limited resources when engaging a larger, more resourced military force; it focuses on attacking the enemy’s physical weak points and psychological battle organisation. Via the application of dislocation, distraction and destruction, the enemy’s understanding, cohesion and will to fight will be undermined. The manoeuvrist approach is part of NATO doctrine (Thorn, 2024).
Blitzkrieg (lightning warfare)
Blitzkrieg warfare is a type of manoeuvrist approach which aims to gain quick military victory by means of rapid movement of mechanised infantry and armoured capabilities which are provide close air support and focus on weak points in the enemy’s line of defence. Blitzkrieg emphasised speed, surprise, and concentrated mobile forces to achieve the rapid collapse of the enemy in a short war, with minimal losses for a relatively small but well‑trained army (Amitabh Sah & TJPRC, 2020). Key features include deep penetrations, encirclements, and attacks against command and logistics to demoralise and paralyse the enemy; Independent armoured and mechanised infantry groups; close coordination with artillery, engineers, and strong air support
COMMANDERS CORE FUNCTIONS
The commander’s core function forms a military doctrine framework that commanders use to organise battlefield activities and optimise combat power against the OPFOR. The core functions include FIND, FIX, STRIKE and EXPLOIT. The JTFC must integrate Operational Level Functions with the Commander’s Core Function and also know which force capabilities are to be utilised for which function.
| NO | FUNCTION | NOTES |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | FIND | Entails locating, identifying and assessing. |
| 2 | FIX | Deception, Distraction, Luring and Surprises are used to create a situation where the OPFOR is FIXED |
| 3 | STRIKE / DESTROY | It entails 2 actions: manoeuvring and hitting. The ME (main effort) is manoeuvred to an optimal position in relation to the OPFRO CoG (Centre of Gravity) and then with decisive firepower the ME hits (strikes) the OPFOR CoG |
| 4 | EXPLOIT | The function which converts small, limited tactical victories into operational gains. |
The Campaign-Winning Cycle
The Campaign-Winning cycle connects dislocation, initiative, and freedom of action to exploitation and destruction.
| No | Component | Explanatory Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Dislocation | The first move or act for campaign success that creates positional and temporal advantages and makes the enemy’s plans less effective (Hoffman, 2021). The main aim of dislocation is to deny the OPFOR Commander’s initiative |
| 2 | Initiative and freedom of action | The ability to seize, retain, and exploit the tempo and direction of operations while restricting the OPFOR’s choices (Henry, 2015). |
| 3 | Exploitation | Exploitation is the conversion of a tactical success into a higher operational gain usually after a successful attack into enemy weakness or collapsed defences (Henåker, 2020). |
| 4 | Destruction | In manoeuvre doctrine, the end goal of military campaigns is the enemy’s organisational breakdown, which will be seen in broken cohesion, diminished will to fight, and surrender (Thunholm & Henåker, 2020). Immediate follow-up to exploitation, proper utilisation of reserves, and avoidance of culmination are important for achieving enemy organisational breakdown (Thunholm & Henåker, 2020). |
DESIGN CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORKS
Centre of Gravity
The main source of power or supply from which a military force, nation, or alliance draws its freedom of action, physical strength and will to act (Spišák, 2026); (Boylan, 2015).
END STATE
End-state is the state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of the campaign / major operation to either terminate or resolve the conflict on favourable terms. The end state in military operations is the set of conditions leaders want military action to create, linking tactical actions to operational outcomes and political aims (MacNealy, 1993; McCreedy, 2001).
INTERMEDIATE END STATE
Intermediate end-states define the conditions that must be obtained at the end of each stage, phase or step. It sets the conditions for the consecutive stages, phase or steps to start.
Lines of operation
A Line of Operation (LOO) is an imaginary line along which a force moves from its base of operations (BOO) towards a given physical objective. LOO are critical to reaching the assigned physical objective. LOO are lines that link Decisive Points in time and space on the path to the COG.
Decisive points (DP)/ Decisive conditions (DC)
A DP is a specific combination of circumstances that is needed to achieve a
campaign objective. It is a combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, a critical factor, or function that, when realised, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over OPFOR, or contribute materially to achieving an operational objective (Paquin, 2007). Decisive points are positions, events, functions, or vulnerabilities that commanders exploit to gain marked advantage as keys to unlocking an enemy centre of gravity or indirect pathways of reaching the enemy centre of gravity (Paquin, 2007); (Vanderbeek, 1988); (Dovey, 1999); (Strain, 1992).
Sequencing
The arrangement of activities within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the elimination of the enemy’s centre of gravity.
STRATEGY
STRATEGIC THEORY
Strategy
Strategy is a method of using means of coercion to create an untenable situation for an opponent in accordance with the ends of policy. A simplistic definition of strategy is ENDS, WAYS and MEANS (Cséfalvay & Kazanský, 2023).
Clausewitz Paradoxical/ Strange Trinity of War
Clausewitz’s “paradoxical” or “strange” trinity is his explanation of what war is and why it behaves so unpredictably. It identifies three fundamental forces whose shifting interaction shapes every war. Clausewitz defines war as a paradoxical trinity composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; the play of chance and probability; and war’s subordination to policy. These factors are linked to the people, the general and his army, and the government (Kelly, 2022; Villacres & Bassford, 1995).
Limited War
Limited war contrasts with total war by restricting aims and trying to keep violence and escalation under control. Limited war involves limited political objectives, rather than destroying the enemy as a political entity (Gray, 2007).
Unlimited War
A war for an unlimited political objective, especially overthrowing the enemy government or rendering it politically helpless, while a limited war pursues more modest goals (Griffin, 2014). Unlimited war can also mean efforts to destroy the enemy’s will or ability to resist by any means necessary, including direct attacks on civilians and supporting infrastructure.
| item | LIMITED WAR | UNLIMITED WAR |
|---|---|---|
| Political Ends | Specific goal Seize terrain, vital assset | Regime/ Government overthrowal or Change |
| military ends | Executing specified objectives to gain leverage for negotiations | Neutralising the enemy’s armed forces and capturing their capital |
| Resource allocation | Restricted | Exhaustive resource mobilisation |
| Example | 1991 Gulf war | 2003 Op Iraqi Freedom |
7 CONTEXTS SHAPING MILITARY STRATEGIC MAKING
- 7 CONTEXTS
- Political
- Sociocultural
- Economic
- Technological
- Military
- Geographical
- Historical
| No | Context | Context Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Political | Military strategy is never purely technical or battlefield-focused. Military is a deeply political choice, shaped by leaders’ goals, domestic institutions, civil–military relations, and broader geopolitical conditions. Military strategy (e.g., annihilation, exhaustion, intimidation, subversion) is shown to be selected primarily by political objectives, leaders’ cognitive frames, regime type, domestic politics, and external environment, not just material or doctrinal factors. Strategy is a way of translating political aims, risk attitudes, and legitimacy concerns into concrete forms of organised violence (Densmaa & Suren, 2024). Civil–military relations: An effective strategy requires senior officers to operate comfortably in a political environment, engaging in “give‑and‑take” with civilians rather than remaining apolitical technicians (Tahirov & Iskandarov, 2026). Grand strategy and civil–military link. Civil–military relations shape A state’s grand strategic orientation (expansive vs cautious use of force); the coherence between political, diplomatic, economic, and military components; and the implementation and real-world effectiveness of grand strategy (Rapp, 2015). Legal and institutional arrangements for civil–military relations (democratic vs authoritarian) affect army building, strategic errors, and the balance between political and military functions (Elbanna et al., 2020). Militaries have political influence not only via coups but also through bureaucratic power, agenda-setting, public esteem, and alliances with societal groups, shaping security policy and deployment decisions (Brooks, 2019). Strategy evolved from military practice into a broader state and political strategy, emphasizing the primacy of politics over military means. Modern military strategy is explicitly tied to political–military contexts such as globalization, information warfare, and “non-war” operations in economic and cyber domains (Lindsay & Gartzke, 2022). |
| 2 | Sociocultural | Military strategy is not shaped only by technology and geography; it is deeply rooted in culture, social structures, and civil–military relations. Culture comprises shared assumptions, norms, myths, and practices that shape how militaries perceive threats, use force, and adapt to change. Strategic culture arises from geography, history, economy, and ethnic identity, framing national ways of war and constraining what political and military elites see as acceptable options (“STRATEGIC CULTURE:: A CRITIQUE,” 2020). – Organisational culture drives offensive vs defensive doctrine choices, beyond pure threat or systemic pressures. – World culture: Global norms of conventional war and humanitarian law constrain organisation and targeting – Internal Social structures & identity reduce usable military power and shape force structure and loyalty – Civil–military relations: Strategic culture conditions doctrine adoption and civil control over operations – Local social context: Understanding societies can prevent missteps. – Cultural training/tools: systematic attention to sociocultural data and education improves planning quality Neglecting sociocultural factors in planning is linked to failed campaigns; integrating them via education, assessment tools, and social‑science partnerships is argued to improve strategic success (Zapfe, 2016). |
| 3 | Economic | Economic conditions strongly shape how states build, use, and plan their military power. Development, budgeting choices, and shocks (like sanctions or crises) to strategy, force posture, and decisions to use force. More economically developed states consistently field more effective forces “soldier-for-soldier,” mainly through better equipment and more skilled personnel, making development a primary determinant of military effectiveness and a core basis for defense planning (Beckley, 2010). – Higher GDP enables larger, more capable forces and higher military expenditure In BRICS countries, economic dependency and strength are “pivotal” in shaping defense strategies; economic stability underpins robust capabilities (Dumitrache & Regional Department of Defence Resources Management Studies, Brașov, 2022). |
| 45 | Technological | Rapid advances in digital, robotic, and AI-based technologies are reshaping how armed forces plan, decide, and fight. New domains and capabilities (AI, cyber, drones, hypersonic weapons, IoMT, space, quantum) expand warfare across land, sea, air, cyber, space, and information domains, forcing doctrinal and strategic adaptation (Akhundov & Hashimov, 2025). Emerging technologies influence defence strategy at grand-strategic and theatre levels, driving new concepts, doctrines, and organisational structures (Raţiu & Roşu, 2021). Technologies (cyber, drones, hypersonic glide vehicles, autonomous weapons) can alter strategic stability, sometimes strengthening defence and crisis stability depending on their diffusion and arms control arrangements (Gimiga, 2021). Planning tools: Modelling, simulation, and wargaming systems allow testing multiple courses of action, assessing risks, and optimizing resources before deployment (Frunzeti et al., 2021). Data-centric technologies (analytics, data science, ML) support situational awareness and planning by processing vast data to guide asset deployment (Montgomery & Nelson, 2025). AI support systems can aid memory, planning, and scenario analysis for senior decision makers, potentially improving state-level decisions on resort to force, but risk overreliance (Horowitz & Lin-Greenberg, 2022). |
| 5 | Military | Military strategy-making is not only about abstract theory; it is heavily shaped by how militaries are organised, how leaders think, and how doctrine and tools structure decisions. Military officers have a professional responsibility to shape strategy, not just execute orders: senior leaders are “morally obligated to help craft the best possible policies and strategies” and must engage in iterative, political dialogue with civilians to build workable strategies (Rapp, 2015). |
| 6 | Geographical | Geography shapes military strategic decision‑making by defining where threats arise, what operations are possible, how forces are organised, and how resources are spent. Modern militaries translate terrain, distance, and human landscapes into decisions through GIS, remote sensing, VR, and formal geographic analysis, while also recognising that these spatial factors evolve over time with politics, technology, and conflict patterns. |
| 7 | Historical | Historical change in war: Nuclear weapons, irregular warfare, cyber, and new generations of war (4th–6th) force continual rethinking of classical theory |
ENDS WAYS AND MEANS
Strategy is often expressed as ends (objectives) + ways (courses of action) + means (resources), forming the basis for many doctrines (Jakobsen, 2022).
Ends–ways–means is a useful structuring tool for military strategy, embedded in doctrine and analysis. However, treating the formula as the essence of strategy can narrow thinking, hide assumptions, and blur the distinct role of strategy. Newer work pushes toward viewing strategy as a theory of success supported—but not defined—by clearly linked ends, ways, means, assumptions, and risks.
Cyberspace: multi-layered digital environment
Cyberspace refers to the interconnected digital environments built on the Internet and related infrastructures, where communication, data exchange, and social life increasingly take place
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